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A Critical Review of the Fair Value Settlement 
Procedure for Stock Options
We review the European practice of fair value settlement of stock options after a successful 
takeover bid. We argue on both fundamental and practical grounds that the inherent 
complexity, arbitrariness and inaccuracy of fair value calculations call for replacement by 
intrinsic value settlement. This alternative is simple, transparent, well-defined, and common 
practice at other exchanges.
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1. Introduction
The takeover of a publicly listed company typically 
results in delisting or a small free float and thin trading. An 
important practical question then is how to deal with the 
outstanding option contracts on the stock of the company. 
If certain conditions are met, option trading is normally 
terminated by the exchange at some point, whereby the 
value of each option series needs to be determined to 
close out any remaining positions.
Two different types of settlement methods are being 
used by option exchanges worldwide. The first is known 
as the intrinsic value method. This method simply means 
that the writer of the option pays the holder the difference 
between the final and unconditional offer price and 
the strike price if the option is in the money, and nothing 
otherwise. Intrinsic value settlement is common practice 
in, for example, the United States (CBOE), Canada and 
Hong Kong. The second type is the fair value method. The 
key difference with the intrinsic value method is that the 
fair value approach attempts to compensate – on top of 
the intrinsic value – for the otherwise foregone time value 
of the option. Because this as-if value is unobservable, the 
method uses a theoretical option pricing model. In fact, it 
seeks to determine the time value as if the takeover has 
not taken place but at the same time assumes the stock 
price to be equal to the offer price. Fair value settlement 
is applied by European option exchanges including NYSE 
Liffe (Amsterdam, Brussels, London, Paris and Lisbon) and 
Eurex (Frankfurt and Zurich).
In this paper we argue that the complexity, arbitrariness 
and inaccuracy of fair value calculations call for 
replacement by intrinsic value settlement. Because of 
the relative complexity of option pricing in general and 
because of the necessity of several rather arbitrary choices 
in particular, we believe that the fair value method is 
detrimental to market transparency. Moreover, the present 
implementation of the method entails inaccuracies and 
a biased outcome because volatility is measured at an 
earlier point in time than the settlement date and at a 
different price/strike ratio than the ratio of the offer price to 
the strike price. In addition to the technical difficulties, we 
also present a more fundamental argument against the fair 
value approach and in favor of intrinsic value settlement. 
Ironically, it can be argued that the intrinsic value is more 
of a “fair” approximation than the value prescribed by the 
fair value method. Altogether, these issues can be harmful 
for the risk-sharing function of option markets as they may 
discourage market participants from trading.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II we describe the fair value methodology of NYSE 
Liffe and present the difficulties associated with it. Section 
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III presents the case of Océ, a Dutch company taken over 
by the Japanese firm Canon in 2010. Section IV concludes.
2. Fair Value Settlement and the Difficulties
We focus on the procedure as applied by NYSE Liffe; Eurex 
applies a highly similar procedure, so the same arguments 
hold.1 NYSE Liffe describes the procedures regarding how it 
adjusts derivatives contracts in response to various types of 
corporate actions – including stock splits, rights issues, and 
mergers and takeovers – in a document entitled “NYSE Liffe 
Corporate Actions Policy”.2
2.1 Fair Value Settlement
The first step in the case of mergers and takeovers is to 
determine whether and when the transaction initiates the 
fair value procedure. NYSE Liffe’s Corporate Actions Policy 
states that adjustments to option contracts are made when 
a bid is declared unconditional and if the majority of the 
shares of the target company are acquired, that is, at 
least fifty percent plus one of the outstanding shares.3 The 
acquiring firm’s method of payment then determines the 
type of adjustment that applies. If the acquirer is paying 
in shares that constitute more than one third of the value 
of the offer and if these shares are or will be traded on the 
same exchange as the target’s shares, then the outstanding 
options are normally replaced by options on the acquirer’s 
shares through the so-called ratio method. In all other cases 
the fair value method is implemented.
The fair value method builds on the binomial tree model 
of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979; henceforth CRR). This 
appears to be the appropriate choice for this purpose 
over, for example, the Black and Scholes (1973) model, 
because it is relatively flexible and can handle dividend 
payments and options of the American type. As with any 
other valuation model, the inputs into the CRR model are 
of crucial importance for the accuracy of the outcome. 
These inputs are the share price, volatility, risk-free rate, and 
expected dividends.
The share price that is employed as the starting point in 
the CRR model is the price of the final and unconditional 
offer. To determine the size of the up- and down movements 
in the binomial tree, volatility is estimated for each option 
series separately and based on the average implied 
volatilities derived from the settlement prices (calculated 
and published by NYSE Liffe for the purpose of daily margin 
calculations) of the option series in the ten days preceding 
the announcement of the first offer.4 The interest rate that 
is being used varies across cases and is communicated 
through the relevant corporate action notice. Maturities 
of the risk free rates are matched to those of the options 
by means of linear interpolation. Expected dividends, 
finally, are estimates from analysts at Markit, a commercial 
financial information services firm.
2.2 Main Methodological Problems
Our main issues with respect to the practical 
implementation of the fair value method have to do with 
the volatility estimates. To arrive at the desired fair value 
of an option, the as-if (the takeover has not taken place) 
volatility is required as an input. Unfortunately, the implied 
volatility of option prices typically decreases substantially 
with the announcement of a bid, especially when the 
offer is primarily or fully in cash and uncertainty around the 
transaction is low (Hutson and Kearney, 2001).5 Measuring 
an option’s implied volatility after the moment the offer has 
been announced would therefore underestimate the as-
if volatility (volatility if the takeover had not taken place), 
and thus also the as-if value.
As a solution, NYSE Liffe uses implied volatilities derived 
from settlement prices prior to the announcement as 
volatility estimates.6,7 We argue that this approach entails 
bias and inaccuracy for two reasons.
The first reason is the volatility-skew effect. For equity 
options there is a negative relation between the strike 
price of options (calls and puts) and their implied volatility 
(MacBeth and Merville, 1979; Rubinstein, 1994). Given that 
the bid price is normally substantially higher than the share 
price prior to the announcement (see, for example, Betton, 
Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008), the volatility skew results in a 
systematic overestimation of as-if volatility when implied 
volatilities derived from pre-announcement prices are 
used. Writers (holders) of calls and puts are thus generally 
disadvantaged (advantaged) because of the volatility 
skew effect.
The second reason relates to timing and maturity effects. 
Because there are normally several months between the 
announcement of the bid and the moment of settlement of 
the options after the offer is declared unconditional, there is 
a timing and maturity mismatch between implied volatility 
measurement and fair value settlement. The implied 
volatility of an option is, for example, measured five months 
before expiration and then used four months later to value 
the option at the settlement date when only one month 
of maturity remains. These mismatches are problematic 
because the slope of the term structure of implied volatilities 
is generally not flat and varies through time (Mixon, 2005). 
In addition, implied volatilities change stochastically and 
with mean reversion (Stein, 1989). The hidden assumption 
22 
of maturity-invariant and constant implied volatility 
disregards an important part of the dynamics, and means 
an inaccuracy in the fair value method.
NYSE Liffe’s choice to measure the implied volatilities 
over the ten days preceding the bid entails an additional 
problem, because price formation is typically contaminated 
by the event at that time. Implied volatilities on average 
increase significantly in advance of a transaction 
announcement (Jayaraman, Mandelker and Shastri, 1991; 
Levy and Yoder, 1993). The use of contaminated pre-bid 
values leads to an additional overestimation of as-if volatility 
and an additional wealth transfer from writers to holders as 
compared to “clean” as-if settlement. This systematic bias 
can easily be avoided by using another estimation period, 
but in any case the precise estimates will remain subject 
to the (to some extent arbitrary) time window that is being 
used.
2.3 Other Methodological Issues
Although the main problems of the fair value method are 
related to the volatility estimates, the precise outcomes of 
fair value calculations also depend on how the expected 
dividends and the risk-free rate are determined.
For the expected dividends, NYSE Liffe uses the dividend 
forecasts of analysts at the commercial company Markit. 
Even if these analysts are the best in their class, it is unlikely 
that their subjective estimations precisely coincide 
with aggregate market expectations. Ideally, market 
expectations are being used. If fair value settlement is 
held onto, an alternative approach might be to derive the 
required information from market prices. Recent academic 
literature shows substantial progress in extracting forward-
looking information from option markets, including expected 
dividends. For example, Golez (2014) demonstrates that 
dividend growth rates implied in option prices are reliable 
predictors of actual dividend growth rates.
The most commonly used proxy for the risk-free interest 
rate by NYSE Liffe is the Euribor rate. Euribor was, for 
example, used in the Océ-Canon case. Choices that we 
observed for other fair value calculations include Libor, 
Nibor, and US deposit rates. Given the risk-neutral valuation 
principle of the CRR model, the interest rate should be 
risk free. As illustrated by the evaporation of liquidity in 
(interbank) money markets during the recent global 
financial crisis, rates like Euribor are not always risk free 
because of credit risk. Also, apart from recent concerns 
about the establishment of some interbank rates, an 
additional issue with Euribor, Libor and Nibor is that these 
rates do not extend beyond one year. NYSE Liffe applies 
linear extrapolation for options with a maturity of more 
than one year, and thus questionably assumes a linear 
term structure. For the purpose of fair value calculations, 
a better proxy in the light of these issues is the Eonia swap 
rate, also known as the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate. 
As for expected dividends, another alternative could be 
to derive the risk-free rate from market prices (Brenner and 
Galai, 1986). Clearly, all these methodological difficulties 
do not apply to the intrinsic value method.
2.4 A Fundamental Argument
A very different issue is that the interpretation of what 
constitutes a “fair value” is not clear cut, and, ironically, 
there are reasons to claim that the intrinsic value is a more 
“fair” approximation than the value prescribed by the 
fair value method. As already outlined above, the key 
difference between the two methods is in the preservation 
of time value. Because volatility is the main unknown in 
the determination of time value, the problem can be 
roughly narrowed down to the interpretation issue of what 
constitutes a “fair volatility” input. The fair value method 
uses implied volatilities from a pre-announcement period, 
whereas the intrinsic value method effectively assumes 
zero volatility. Although we do not claim to have the one 
correct answer, there are two arguments that favor zero 
volatility. First, after an offer is declared unconditional and 
outstanding options are closed out, shareholders tendering 
their shares during a post closing acceptance period 
receive the exact same offer price. For options with a 
limited remaining maturity this suggests that the assumption 
of zero volatility comes close to economic reality.
The second argument is related to the law of one price. 
Economically, and abstracting from imperfections such as 
tax effects, a successful cash offer for a company’s shares 
is equal to a successful asset acquisition in cash (where the 
acquirer buys all the target’s assets and liabilities rather than 
its shares). In the latter case, options are not settled and – 
assuming the cash in the firm is not employed and ultimately 
available to shareholders – the implied volatilities are closely 
approximated by zero. In the spirit of the law of one price, it 
seems natural to preserve this similarity for options and align 
the settlement price after a stock acquisition with the value 
of the same option after the economically identical event 
of an asset acquisition. This value will normally not be very 
different from the intrinsic value.8
An additional drawback of the fair value method 
relative to the intrinsic value method is that it creates an 
artificial dichotomy between the price formation of options 
that expire before the date at which the offer is to be 
declared unconditional (or extended or withdrawn) and 
those expiring thereafter. Decreasing uncertainty about 
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the offer entails convergence towards the intrinsic value 
in the former case and towards the potential fair value 
settlement price in the latter case. Also, because the fair 
value outcome is an important but not very salient and 
transparent additional factor in the pricing of options 
expiring after that date, these options lose some of their 
appeal as indicators of the market’s view on the likelihoods 
of possible takeover scenarios.
3. Example: Océ
To illustrate some of the points raised in the previous 
section we consider the case of Océ, a Dutch company 
specialized in developing and manufacturing printing 
and copying hardware and software. After a listing of 
more than 60 years on the Amsterdam stock exchange, 
this company was acquired by its Japanese rival Canon. 
On 16 November 2009, Canon announced its all-cash 
offer of €8.60 per share, amounting to €730 million for all 
outstanding shares. The bid was declared effective on 4 
March 2010, and after a post closing acceptance period 
and a squeeze-out procedure Océ was delisted as per 14 
February 2012. In line with the NYSE Liffe’s fair value policy 
described above, all outstanding option contracts were 
closed out and settled on 4 March 2010.
Figure 1 displays the stock price of Océ over the year 
2009. The graph clearly shows that the announcement lead 
to a large price jump. After the prior closing price of €5.065, 
the closing price on November 16 was €8.624. Over the 
months before Canon’s announcement the company’s 
stock price had already increased substantially, possibly 
partly in anticipation of a possible takeover.
Figure 1: Stock Price Océ
Notes: The figure displays the stock price of Océ over the year 
2009. On November 16, Canon announced a cash offer of €8.60 
per share.
Figure 2 displays the implied volatilities of Océ stock 
options for all different maturities and strike prices available 
before the announcement of the offer. Around the time 
of the announcement of the offer in November 2009, the 
remaining maturities of the December, March and June series 
were about one, four and seven months, respectively. The 
graphs also show the implied volatilities for two alternative 
ten-day measurement periods that start at the 30th and 
20th trading day prior to the announcement rather than at 
the prescribed tenth day. The December options expired 
in the period between bid and acceptance, whereas the 
other two were closed out and settled in cash after Canon 
declared its bid unconditional in March 2010. At the time of 
fair value settlement, the actual remaining maturities were 
two weeks and 2.5 months, respectively.9
Figure 2: Implied Volatilities
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Notes: The graphs A-F display the implied volatilities for Océ from 
the December 2009 series (A & B), the March 2010 series (C & D) 
and the June 2010 series (E & F) calculated on the basis of NYSE 
Liffe’s procedure. The solid black (solid gray; dashed gray) line 
connects the values derived from settlement prices over the ten 
trading days as from the 10th (20th; 30th) trading day prior to the 
announcement.
A first observation from the implied volatility figures 
concerns the patterns. Especially for the shorter-maturity 
options there is a clear U-shape pattern over the different 
strike prices. The fair value method assumes the stock price 
to be equal to the offer price but sets an option’s volatility 
input equal to pre-announcement implied volatility. As a 
result, it ignores the implied-volatility effect of the large 
change in the moneyness of both calls and puts resulting 
from the takeover premium.
A second observation is the sensitivity of the implied 
volatilities to the choice of the ten-day measurement period. 
Especially for the longer-maturity options, the alternative 
measurement periods generally yield substantially higher 
implied volatilities than the ten trading days preceding 
the announcement. Although the case of Océ apparently 
is not a good example of the more widely observed 
increase of implied volatilities in advance of a transaction 
announcement, it does show the sensitivity of the estimates 
to the time window that is being employed.
The final observation is the difference in both the level and 
the pattern of implied volatilities across different maturities. 
Implied volatility is clearly maturity dependent, casting 
doubt on the accuracy of measuring a series’ implied 
volatility multiple months prior to the actual valuation.
4. Conclusions
In the light of the fundamental and practical problems 
related to the current European practice of fair value 
settlement of stock options after a successful takeover bid, 
we call for adoption of the intrinsic value method. The aim 
of the fair value method to compensate for foregone time 
value of prematurely expiring options is commendable 
but demands many subjective valuation choices that 
bring along complexity, arbitrariness and inaccuracy. 
Moreover, the volatility inputs that are presently being 
used by exchanges are systematically biased relative to 
what would constitute a “fair” input, and correcting for this 
would make the method even more complex. Even though 
traded options are complete contracts whose value can 
always be theoretically determined, we believe that such 
difficulties are detrimental to market transparency and 
therefore preferably avoided. The intrinsic value method 
does not entail any of these problems, and, as we argued, 
there are grounds to claim that intrinsic values are fair 
settlement prices that reflect economic reality.
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Note
1. See http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/products/equ/corporate-actions-procedures for more details. 
The implied volatility calculations are equivalent; the choices regarding risk-free interest rate and expected dividend 
differ somewhat.
2. At the time of writing, the latest version of the description of the procedures was issued on 14 December 2012 and 
effective as of 1 January 2013; see https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/nyse-liffe/corporate-action-policies.
3. NYSE Liffe uses a level that is at the lower end of the range of reasonable threshold values. Clearly, the precise 
choice of the percentage that initiates the settlement procedure is to some extent arbitrary.
4. In fact, the average is taken over eight days as the highest and the lowest implied volatility observation are not 
taken into consideration.
5. Hutson and Kearney (2001) argue that the lower implied volatility is a consequence of the convergence of opinions 
regarding the value of the target firm.
6. The policy document does not spell out in detail how implied volatilities are calculated. Personal correspondence 
pointed out that NYSE Liffe uses the CRR model with a trinomial tree for this purpose. This is inconsistent with the 
binomial tree that is used to calculate the fair value of the option. Chan et al. (2009) illustrate that the choice of 
tree can have substantial effect on the pricing performance. Another issue is the number of steps in the tree. The 
exchange uses the number of days to maturity, with a maximum of 100. For options with a relatively low number of 
days to maturity, the corresponding low number of steps could induce noise in the estimated price; see Diener and 
Diener (2004).
7. Alternatives include a simulation approach that models the time-varying implied volatility surface and a cross-
sectional approach that uses the implied volatilities of similar firms.
8. If the method of payment is stock instead of cash, the similarity across the two acquisition types holds automatically 
when the acquirer’s shares will be traded on the target’s exchange, as option trading is not terminated then (see 
Section II). Our law-of-one-price argument does not apply if the method of payment is stock and the acquirer’s 
shares will not be traded on the target’s exchange, as implied volatility is not approximated by zero in asset 
acquisitions then.
9. An additional methodological choice that can be especially material for short maturities is the choice between the 
calendar time and the trading time approach. Our calculations point out that NYSE Liffe uses the number of days on 
the calendar as the time until expiration. This approach is at odds with studies indicating that trading days should be 
used (Fama, 1965; French, 1980; Roll, 1984; French and Roll, 1985).
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